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WILLINGESS-TO-PAY FOR INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE ON PRODUCT TRACEABILITY FROM THE U.S.A.,
CANADA, THE U.K., AND JAPAN
David L. Dickinson and Dee Von Bailey

ABSTRACT

Traceable product systems provide a tool to track the inputs of a final good throughout
the entire production chain. This tool can provide valuable information to consumers on
verifiable characteristics of the product, can improve the speed of product recall, and can help
identify areas of inefficiency in the product chain. Recent examples of traceable systems include
those used in the diamond, lumber, and food industries. This article reports results from a case
study on traceability using Vickrey auctions to generate willingness-to-pay (WTP) data for
traceability and related product characteristics. Specifically, we examine WTP for traceable
meat, which is a timely topic given that major customers and competitors in the multi-billion
dollar red-meat market are all implementing traceable meat systems. However, the largest player
in world red-meat markets, the U.S., is lagging in the development of these systems. We conduct
comparable auctions in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Japan and find that subjects are willing
to pay a nontrivial premium for traceability, but the same subjects show even higher WTP for
traceability-provided characteristics like additional meat safety and humane animal treatment
guarantees. The implication is that producers can likely implement such a traceable meat system
profitably by tailoring the verifiable characteristics of the product to consumer preferences. For
other types of traceable products, these results highlight the importance of full exploitation of
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traceable systems by providing consumers with the additional product information that only a
traceable system can verify.

JEL classifications: e90, D44, D80
Key words: traceability, auction experiments, information

WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY FOR INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE ON PRODUCT TRACEABILITY FROM THE U.S.A.,
CANADA, THE U.K., AND JAPAN**

Introduction

Traceability, or identity preservation, of products is a timely topic in many countries. A
traceable food system allows one to preserve the identity of the inputs used in food products
throughout the entire production chain. Traceability provides a tool that can track accountability
in commodity systems where commingling has traditionally provided anonymity to some market
participants. For example, traceability in the diamond industry is aimed at tracking diamonds
from mine to market in order to reduce trade in so-called "conflict" diamonds (i.e., those used to
finance wars and arms purchases). Identity preservation in logging can identify illegally logged
old-growth forest trees and also provide an information base for calculating dividend payments
to a partner upon sale of the timber. Such systems can serve numerous functions, such as
providing valued information to consumers, aiding in the speed of product recalls, identifying
producer liability in the event of criminal acts or negligence, and identifying inefficiencies in a
product marketing chain. Traceability is distinct from other means of certifying information in
that it is the foundation of systems designed to demand accountability at each level of the
marketing chain. In short, traceability provides the basis for verifying information about

*Acknowledgements: This research is supported by USDA, CSREES grant No. 2001-01714. Partial
support was also provided by the Utah Department of Agriculture and Food and the Utah Agricultural Experiment
Station. This project would not have been possible without the efforts of numerous individuals. We especially thank
Richard Baines from the Royal Agricultural College, Jill Hobbs at the University of Sasketchewan, Kouzo Kasahara
and Shoichi Ito from Tottori University, and Von Mendenhall, Daren Comsforth, and Dale ZoBell from Utah State
University. Valuable comments were provided by Jason Shogren and seminar participants at the University of
Sasketchewan. We thank Hisako Kure for translation of the Japanese experimental instructions and paperwork.
Valuable research assistance was also provided by Li Wan, Francisco Gonzalez-Diaz, and Nitesh Saha.
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products, especially at the producer level, rather than simply being another piece of information
itself.
Traceability in lumber, diamonds, and food products (e.g., meats and grains) are all
recent examples of a trend towards identity preservation in a wide variety of products.
Greenpeace has lobbied for traceability in the logging industry to help protect old-growth forest
timber from illegal logging, and the Clean Diamonds Trade Act of2001 in the U.S. calls for a
system of diamond traceability. Though traceable food systems in U.S. competitor and customer
markets are becoming the standard, and though debate has been active surrounding traceable
food systems in the U.S., there is currently very limited legislation mandating food system
traceability. 1 The highly publicized outbreaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or
((Mad-Cow" disease) in the U.K., Japan and more recently in Canada, have brought to the
forefront the issue of food traceability because Mad Cow originates from the use of contaminated
feeds. 2 Though the U.S. has yet to experience a verified case of Mad Cow, food traceability has
been at the heart of much discussion for food system improvement in the multi-billion dollar
meat and grain industries. 3 This article is an important extension of our earlier work (Dickinson
and Bailey, 2002) and provides a unique case study in consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
traceable products by examining meat in four industrialized countries that vary in their current
experience with Mad Cow disease and other industry setbacks. Our objective is to not only
provide general evidence on WTP for traceability versus traceability-provided characteristics in
products but to also provide initial evidence on international consumer WTP for meat traceability

I"Country-of-Origin" labeling for meat products was mandated in the current U.S. Farm Bill, but this
requires no tracking of other characteristics.
2Traditional food inspection systems have focused on identifying food contaminated with pathogens such
as E. coli 0157 :H7 or Salmonella where the principal risks for contamination were at the food processing or food
preparation levels. Mad Cow originates with farm-level inputs rendering traditional inspection systems virtually
useless to identify this problem without the ability to track inputs to the farm level.
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and other food attributes that can be verified with traceable meat systems. Such initial evidence
can then help reduce the cost and risk of larger-scale retail trials of traceable products. 4
We report results on WTP for traceability, transparency, and extra-quality assurances
(TTA) in pork in the U.S., Canada, Japan, and the U.K. We also study WTP for beef in the U.S .
and Canada. These countries were chosen to generate data on a reasonable variety of
industrialized countries at different stages in their own experience with traceable meat systems.
From our U.S. perspective, some also represent large competitors (Canada and the EU) and
customers (Japan and Canada) with the U. S. in international meat markets. One may view the
results of this study as limited to WTP for meat traceability in a myopic sense. However, certain
results are likely to be of broader interest given that they may indicate a WTP for a particular
product characteristic or for traceable product systems in general. For example, we find that
individuals in the U.S. and Canada are willing to pay even more for food safety guarantees than
for traceability alone. This likely implies a general concern for product safety and not just beef or
pork safety. Supporting evidence of this view can be found in the recent StarLink com episode,s
the general concerns often expressed over biotech foods, or the concerns over toy or vehicle
safety. Similarly, a WTP for humane animal treatment may reflect a broader WTP for
environmentally friendly product attributes. This does not diminish the importance of the
redmeat industry as the focus of this study. Traceable meat systems have been at the forefront of

The value of sales in the beef industry alone approaches $64 billion annually.
For example, valuation experiments of this sort have been found good at predicting sales when a price
premium is attached to the product (Shogren et aI., 1999).
3

4

5The StarLink episode refers to the September 2000 revelation that StarLink com had been detected in the
human food supply. The com, which had been genetically modified, had been approved for animal feed but not for
human consumption. Estimates of the total cost to Aventis CropScience (makers of StarLink com) have been
reported as high as $500 million.
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the traceability discussions in the U.S. as the meat industry is likely to be heavily impacted by
our country's immediate direction on the traceability issue.

Background
Our choice to study traceability in meat is motivated by the importance of this industry in
the U.S. and Canada in both its magnitude and in the widespread effects that any system failure
would have in this industry. Experts generally agree that the U.S. meat industry is vulnerable to
large and expensive food recalls (Salin and Hooker, 2001). Contamination in ground beef
prompted a 19 million pound recall of ground beef in July 2002. Such large scale recalls are
often necessitated by the U.S. 's current inability to accurately trace the source of a contamination
to the product's final location. In the aftermath of this massive recall Lea Brooks, spokeswoman
for the California state health department, stated '" [w ] e are trying to determine if the product is
still on the shelf. ... We don't know for certain where it has gone. '" (quoted in the L.A. Times,
July 20, 2002). The recent BSE crisis in Canada has been devastating. Canada exports
approximately 60% of the beef and cattle it produces. The closure of Canada's borders to beef
and cattle exports following the discovery of a cow with BSE in Alberta in late May 2003 was
estimated to cost the industry USD $13 million per day6 in lost exports
http://wv·./\v.nl1a.com.au/content.cfm?sid=1017&ne\vsid=2383).
Bio-secuhty risks have raised new government concerns about efficient food recall in the
event of a terrorist-initiated food system contamination. A September 2002 theft of a bacterium
from a Michigan State University lab prompted the National Pork Board to " ... urge producers to
be on a heightened state of alert." (www.porkboard.org/News/Ne\vsEdit.asp?NewsID=299). The

6 This figure becomes even more impressive when one considers that Canadian cattle sales are
approximately $7.6 billion annually according to the Winnipeg Free Press, May 21 , 2003.
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threat of meat contamination due to either bio-terrorism, negligence, or accident, has the
potential to undermine consumer confidence in the U.S. meat industry. The result would not only
be reduced consumption of U.S. red meat by domestic consumers, but also the potential loss of
market share among our key trading partners as foreign customers become more and more
demanding of traceable systems in the meat products they import (Liddell and Bailey, 2001). If,
for example, falling demand for U.S. beef caused a price decline of merely 10%, this would
translate into total annual revenue losses of greater than $3.7 billion dollars. 7 And it may not take
much for consumers to react to adverse news in a way that could cause such a drop in retail beef
prices. An interesting measure of consumer demand sensitivity for U.S. red meat can be found in
looking back on 1996, when beef prices " ... fell to their lowest levels in years ... " only minutes
after a 1996 Oprah Winfrey (talk show) broadcast focusing on Mad Cow disease. Upon learning
of how infection of Mad Cow could spread in U.S. beef she promptly stated that such
information" .. .has just stopped me cold from eating another burger. " (quotes from BBC news,
http://news.bbc.co.ukll /hi/worldJ48964.stn1).8
Current European meat systems require varying degrees of traceability but were
developed in the wake of their Mad Cow crisis. As such, they were developed to allay consumer
fears regarding food safety and appear to have been relatively successful in this regard. For
example, Sorenson et al. (2003) found that, while per capita beef consumption in Geneva,
Switzerland declined dramatically at the beginning of the crisis in 1996, by 1999 beef
consumption levels were almost identical with 1993. However, since full meat traceability

7Based on an average retail elasticity of -0.65 reported by Huang (1993), per capita beef consumption of
66.2Ibs. in 2001 , USDA reported weighted average retail beef price of$3 .37/Ib. in 2001 as reported by Robb
(2002), and estimated U. S. population of285.9 million in 2001.
8Some experts claim that prices fell due to oversupply or other economic factors, but Texas state cattlemen
sued Oprah Winfrey for $12 million in a well-publicized libel lawsuit. The case was eventually ruled in favor of
Oprah.
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systems are not mandatory in the U. S., the issue of consumer WTP for traceability has been of
central importance to the U. S. meat industry (Liddell and Bailey, 2001; Bailey, Jones, and
Dickinson, 2002). Along this same vein, traceability is an attribute that can be used to certify
other potentially valuable product characteristics. An example would be using traceability to
certify the processes used in making a product, also referred to as transparency. Or, traceability
could be used to provide extra-quality assurances about product characteristics that are otherwise
invisible such as animal, social, or environmental welfare. Lusk et al. (2001), for example, find
that some consumers are willing to pay a premium for non-genetically modified (GM) chips, but
the non-GM status of a chip cannot be verified without traceability. Traceability is therefore a
more fundamental product tool for industry.
Given the magnitude of the red meat industry, there is clearly much at stake in surveying
the future of domestic and foreign demand for U.S. red meat. Representatives for U.S. beef
industry have expressed opposition to an industry standard of traceability in meat systems
(Brasher, 2002). We feel this to be a very limited way of viewing traceability. While traceable
systems are costly,9 the demand side of the market may be such that producers can profitably
exploit such systems. Results from this research show that U. S., Canadian, and overseas
consumers are willing to pay nontrivial amounts for meat traceability and other meat
characteristics that can be verified through traceable systems. Though the final U.S. direction on
traceability in meat and/or grain systems could be a government mandate, our results show that
profitable market opportunities likely exist both domestically and abroad for U.S. producers who
can successfully convey this valued information to consumers.

9Bailey, Jones, and Dickinson (2002) report the cost for implementing traceability in a single, meat supply
chain as being between $10 million and $14 million.
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The WTP Experiments
The experimental design is motivated by the design in Shogren et al. (1994) and is
described in more detail in our previous work (Dickinson and Bailey, 2002). Groups of subjects
participate in an hour-long experiment designed to elicit valuations for food traceability and
other food characteristics. At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects are endowed with
some cash ($15 U.S. or roughly the foreign equivalent in other countries) and a lunch consisting
of, among other things, pork or beef. In all countries except Japan, the meat is included in a
sandwich that is part of the subject's lunch. Sliced ham was used as an addition to a ramen bowl
in the Japanese lunch for cultural appropriateness. The experiment consists of subjects bidding in
a theoretically demand-revealing (second-price) auction format. When subjects place bids, they
bid on what they would be willing to pay to exchange their endowed sandwich (or ham for
Japan) for an auction sandwich (ham) that differed only in terms of the information that could be
verified about the meat in the sandwich (ham).
Though our subj ect pools consisted of individuals affiliated with the Universities
involved in this study, the variety of our experimental groups includes student groups, faculty
groups, professional staff groups (e.g., accountants, secretaries, etc.), and maintenance staff
groups (e.g., buildings and grounds workers, maintenance workers, etc.). As such, there is still a
considerable variation within the subject pools. A total of about fifty-four subjects participated in
each of the experiments in the U.K. and Japan, and about twice as many participated from both
the U.S. and Canada to generate data in both ham and beef experiments.
Each subject in each group placed bids on four auction sandwiches. The meat in
sandwich 1 had verifiable extra measure taken to ensure high-quality or humane animal
treatment. Sandwich 2 had extra verifiable safety in its meat. Sandwich 3 's meat was verifiably
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traceable to the farm level, while sandwich 4 was verifiable on all three of these dimensions.
These different dimensions of meat characteristics are referred to as TTA (traceability,
transparency, and animal assurances) by Liddell and Bailey (2001). Subjects were informed that
the meat in their initially endowed sandwich (or ham), while satisfying national meat standards,
did not possess the additional verifiable levels of assurances that the auction sandwich meat
contained. 10 In addition to written instructions describing the auction process, instructions were
reviewed orally prior to commencement of the experiment. The same experimenters controlled
instructions and protocol in each of the experiment locations. 11
Upon placing bids for auction sandwich 1, subj ects then placed bids for sandwich 2, and
then sandwich 3, followed by sandwich 4 bids. This constituted one round of bidding. Ten total
rounds of bidding were used, and the only difference between the first round and the subsequent
rounds of bidding was that subjects in subsequent rounds of bidding were informed of the market
price (i.e., the second-highest bid) from the previous round for the auction sandwich prior to
placing another bid for that same auction sandwich. Subjects were made aware that bids need not
change at all from one round to the next for a particular auction sandwich, but that bids need not
stay the same either. Bids were not truncated at zero as subjects were allowed to bid negative. To
help clarify the meaning of a negative bid, the subjects were informed that a negative bid would
be appropriate only if the subject would require compensation in order to exchange his sandwich

lOWe made efforts to avoid deception in the information presented to our subjects in these experiments.
Depending on the location, either domestic or imported meat was used in order to ensure verifiable ITA
characteristics, although meat used in anyone location was either all domestic or all imported (in order to avoid
WTP differences for domestic versus imported meat infiltrating our data generation process). Traceable U.S. beef
was obtained using an individual animal grown on a university farm that was slaughtered in facilities at the
university.
IIIn Japan, the authors were present and conducted the experiments through a bilingual (native Japanese
speaking) assistant to ensure as much similarity in protocol as possible with the English language experiments. All
subject materials (e.g., instructions, auction ham descriptions, etc.) were in Japanese and had been translated by a
native Japanese speaker and then reviewed by the assistant who also conducted the oral translation of the
experiments.
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with the auction sandwich.
Subjects were also informed that the purpose of having the winning bidder pay the
second highest price was to remove the incentive to not truthfully reveal their true WTP for the
auction meat. While such information on the theoretical incentives of the auction is not
appropriate for a theory-testing experiment, the purpose of these experiments was not to test
second-price auction theory, but rather to have subjects comprehend the auction process. It was
made clear to subj ects that one random round and one random auction sandwich from that round
would be chosen at the end of the experiment and the auction would then be consummated. As
such, a bid for any auction sandwich in any round stood an equally likely chance of being the
binding bid at the end of the experiment, thus preserving the demand-revealing properties of the
auction for each individual bid. At the end of the auction, a random round and sandwich was
chosen, the auction was consummated and all subj ects then consumed their sandwiches while
completing a brief questionnaire.
A somewhat standard experimental protocol in food auction experiments is to use
practice auctions where subjects bid on a small item such as a candy bar. We did not conduct
practice auctions prior to our ten rounds of bidding for the auction sandwiches. However, to
alleviate concerns that this protocol difference may affect our results, we did conduct additional
experiments as sensitivity tests for our deviations from others' protocols. The data from these
sensitivity tests, which are noted, in Dickinson and Bailey (2002), indicate that our results are not
sensitive to our slightly different experimental protocol. We do, however, view the WTP results
as upper bounds on potential retail consumer WTP (see Hayes et aI., 1995) for TTA
characteristics. Retail trials will likely be an important final step in assessing consumer WTP, but
the experiments we report are also an important low-cost initial step in understanding consumer
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WTP. Shogren et al. (1999) note the value ofWTP data from experimental auctions in their
study that utilized auction, survey, and retail markets in studying WTP for food safety. 12

Experiment Results
Figure 1 and Table 1 present the summary data from the experiments. Figure 1 shows the
bid distributions from our experiments. Each individual's average percentage bid in the final 5
auction rounds for each individual sandwich is the unit of observation used to generate the bid
distributions. Percentage bid is calculated as the subject's actual bid divided by the value of the
baseline sandwich as given by the collaborators who were native to each of the experiment
countries. The percentage bid calculation is therefore sensitive to the baseline value used for the
calculation. Nevertheless, such percentage bids provide for some comparability across countries,
though caution is advised in interpreting the absolute level of overall percentage bids. The final
five rounds of the experiment are arbitrarily chosen as a more stable measure of subject bids than
the initial five rounds (see Shogren et al. (1994), Hayes et al (1995), and Shogren et al. (1995)).
Turning to Table 1, it is noteworthy that in every case subjects bid, on the average,
statistically higher for meat with all three TT A characteristics than one that only had one
verifiable characteristic (bottom three rows of Table 1).13 Though this may seem obvious since
more information is more valuable than less, it is still significant since a single traceable system

12Wood and Bruhn (2000) and Aldrich and Blisard (1998) reach a somewhat different conclusion. They
note that stated preferences against genetically altered foods do not stop consumers from purchasing such foods in
the retail environment. Their results are, however, specific to genetic alterations that might traditionally be viewed
negatively by consumers. Our study focuses on characteristics likely to be viewed positively. Their results do,
however, show the importance of retail trials or retail market data in making fmal conclusions of the magnitude of
consumer WTP for TTA characteristics.
13Comments in this section on statistic significance are based on results of the Friedman (1937)
nonparametric test, which is used to compare an experimental group 's WTP rankings. This test is appropriate where
data can be arranged in independent block (i.e., each of our experimental groups), but where treatments within a
block (i.e. , the auction sandwiches) can be ranked according to some criterion, which in our case is WTP. As such, it
yields slightly different results than simply comparing average percentage bids from Table 1. When any significance
is noted, significance is at the a = .10 level or higher.
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can be used to verify and trace infonnation on multiple characteristics, including those tested. In
fact, it is interesting to note that in the U.S. and in Canada average bids are significantly higher
for the combined TT A characteristics than for traceability alone, even though traceability is a
necessary condition to verify fann-Ievel food safety measures and animal assurances. The
average subject is likely not aware of this (though we did not inquire), which highlights the
importance of consumer education in creating profitable markets for TT A products.
Among individual characteristics, traceability alone was significantly less valued than
either food safety or animal assurances in the U.S. and Canada (though not significantly less so
for beef in Canada). In contrast, there are no significant differences in average bids for individual
TTA characteristics in the U.K. and Japan, though percentage bids for all characteristics are
higher in Japan. The fact that both the U.K. and Japan have experienced verified incidents of
Mad-Cow disease while the U.S. and Canada had not (at the time of our experiments) may be at
the heart of this result that British and Japanese participants did not differentiate between
traceability and other characteristics like added assurances about food safety. However, evidence
from more controlled multi-variate analysis will shed additional light on this. An implication is
that profitable U.S. exports markets already exist in countries that have more fully recognized the
value of traceability (i.e., in such countries the WTP for traceability alone is no less than WTP
for meat safety or animal treatment). Characteristics that can be verified through traceable
systems are valued in the U.S. and Canada, but traceability itself is less valued, on the average,
than the other single characteristics (animal welfare and meat safety). This result could change in
two obvious ways. First, as has recently occurred in Canada, a country could experience a Madcow or similar outbreak, thus "educating" consumers the hard way about the value of
traceability. A second way is for producers to better educate consumers on the value of

12
traceability and/or on the link between traceability and other extrinsic meat characteristics that
they already value.
Table 2 presents parametric analysis of average bid behavior with controls for age,
income, education, and knowledge of food-borne diseases. The dependent variable is the
subject's average bid from the final five rounds of the experiment for each of the auction meat
products. Since subj ects may experience some affiliation of values given the market price
feedback following the first auction round, a market price variable is included in our
specification. Market Price measures the average market price for each sandwich from the first
five rounds of the auction-market price as defined for the econometric analysis is therefore
exogenous. We also include experiment group controls (suppressed in Table 2 for space
considerations) and a random effects component that captures the potential lack of independence
of an individual's bid across different sandwiches.
In other words, we view this data as panel data where individuals are the cross-sectional

units and the "time-series" are the bids across sandwiches for that individual. A Lagrange
multiplier test on each of the models in Table 2 indicates that individual-specific effects, in
addition to those captured in our demographic variables, are present in the data. This suggests
either a random effects or fixed effects specification. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate a fixed
effects model for a specification that includes individual-specific demographic variables due to a
perfect collinearity problem. As such we are unable to perform the standard Hausman test to
compare the appropriateness of fixed versus random effects in our Table 2 specifications. We
therefore proceed with the random effects modeling as the best alternative for estimating the bid
functions. 14

14m the event that the individual random effects were correlated with the other regressors, the coefficient
estimates in Table 2 would be inconsistent. We would note, however, that the treatment effects estimated in Table 2
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Results reported in Table 2 show that subjects' WTP across countries is uniformly higher
for the combined meat attributes, perhaps not surprisingly. IS Subjects in the U.K. do not value
meat safety as an individual characteristic any higher than traceability alone, although they are
willing to pay a significant additional premium for assurances of humane animal treatment in
Table 2. Japanese subjects are willing to pay a significantly higher premium for meat safety and
animal treatment than for traceability alone. Overall, the treatment variable results from Table 2
show that animal treatment and meat safety are generally valued more highly than traceability
alone, and WTP for the combined attributes is highest. However, raw bid data show that WTP
for the combined attributes is less than the sum of the three individual characteristics, indicating
a diminishing marginal utility for traceability and other extrinsic meat characteristics that can be
provided by traceable systems.
We also examine age, income, education, and knowledge of food-borne diseases as key
demographic variables that may influence a subject's WTP for the extrinsic meat characteristics
we examine. Our Table 2 results show that older subjects are willing to pay more for the
traceable pork product in Japan and in Canada. Higher income Japanese subjects are willing to
pay less, and education is an insignificant determinant of subjects' WTP across all samples. The
level of subject knowledge about food-borne illnesses, as proxied by the number of articles read
on such subjects (Articles), shows a curiously opposite effect in the U.S. versus Canada.
Additional information, as proxied by Articles, increases WTP in the U.S. but decreases WTP in

are highly consistent with those from the summary data in Table 1. The only exception is the UK pork results, where
the Table 2 estimates indicate a slightly higher WTP for animal treatment than traceability. This is in minor contrast
to the group bid percentages in Table 1. Given this, we doubt that our principal results are due to a misspecification
of the individual-specific error term.
15The only case in which we fail to reject the null hypothesis (at the a = .10 level) of equal coefficients
using the Wald test is in comparing the coefficient on animal treatment and the combined attributes in the U.S. pork
sample (p = .18).
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Canada. Beef traceability has been mandated in Canada but not in the U. S. Consequently, one
would expect that Canadian consumers have been exposed to more investigative, popular press
articles about traceability than American consumers. At the time of these experiments many
Canadian consumers may not have perceived an immediate need for meat traceability since no
Mad-cow crisis had yet developed there. The result may have been not only more awareness
about traceability in Canada than in the U. S., but perhaps also a bit more disillusionment about
what traceability can actually achieve. That is, well-informed Canadian consumers understood
that they would bear at least some of the cost for traceable meat system, but they are not yet
convinced about the benefits of traceability. One other way of interpreting this result is in terms
of diminishing marginal benefits. It is logical to expect diminishing marginal benefits of
additional information (i.e., articles) at some point, and a negative coefficient on Articles in
Canada is consistent with the average Canadian subject being at a point of negative marginal
benefit of additional information on food-borne illnesses.
Overall, across all countries, the demographic variables we examine are usually
insignificant determinants of subjects' WTP. This is an important finding, because it indicates
that the market potential for traceable meat products is broad and cannot be defined well by
demographic characteristics. Dickinson and Bailey (2002) report that demographic
characteristics are likely an important determinant of WTP, but their result is inferred from using
only group control dummies for each of the different experimental cohorts with no individual
demographic controls. Since subjects in their study were also grouped by types (e.g., all students,
all faculty, etc.) for the experiments, it was reasonable to consider that group differences in WTP
reflected the demographic differences of the groups. Our current results show that a more

15
detailed analysis of key demographic variables finds less significance overall than anticipated. 16
Though our results suggest that the variation in WTP across characteristics is largely not
affected by the demographics of the subjects, it is still of interest to examine the magnitude of the
WTP effects for distinct meat types. Given that we examine both beef and pork in the U.S. and
Canada, we conduct Chow tests for structural differences to determine if the coefficients on the
three treatment variables (Animal Treatment, Meat Safety, Combined Attributes) are significantly
different in the beef equation compared to the pork equation for each country. The results
indicate that the coefficients on the treatment variables in beef differ significantly from those for
pork in both the U.S. and Canada (F[3,408]=21.6 for the U.S . and F[3,416]=3.67 for Canada) at
least at the 5% level. Such results are sensitive to our choice of baseline sandwich value since
bids are expressed as a percentage of baseline sandwich value, and so in general we advise
caution in making any direct comparisons of WTP magnitudes across countries. However, recall
that all details of the subject lunch and sandwich in the U.S. and Canada are identical except for
the roast beef or ham in the sandwich. These results are most likely not an artifact of the baseline
auction product value, since the experiments and auction lunch are most similar in the U.S. and
Canada. Comparability of percentage WTP magnitudes would be more cautioned for the U.K.
sandwich and a Japanese ramen bowl experiments, for example, since certain details of the
auction product and lunch differed to maintain the cultural appropriateness of the lunch.
The key result from the Chow tests on U.S. and Canadian results from Table 2 is that
subjects seem willing to pay higher premiums for the beef with additional animal treatment, meat
safety, or combined traceability attributes guarantees than for pork with similar additional
guarantees, independent of the demographics for which we control. In Table 2, the range of price

16Recall that we do include group dummies in the current analysis so that the results in Table 2 are
controlled for possible group effects.
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premiums individual subjects are willing to pay for attributes other than traceability alone in the
U.S. is estimated from 4%-9% for pork and 9%-28% for beef. In Canada it is 2%-6% for pork
and 8%-18% for beef (see treatment variable coefficients in Table 2). As such, profitable markets
for food attributes that can be guaranteed through traceable systems may be more likely for beef
than for pork. This is likely a result of more publicized and serious meat safety scares for beef
products than for pork (e.g., the 2002 ConAgra beef recall, the 1996 Mad Cow cases in the U.K.,
the 1993 Jack in the Box food poisoning incident), but it is nevertheless ironic given that more
resistance to implementation of traceable systems in the U.S. has come from the beef industry as
opposed to the pork industry.
A final item worth noting is that, though consumers' WTP is significantly positive on the
average, a significant number of our subjects were not willing to pay any positive amount for
certain attributes. Across countries, anywhere from 9% (Japan) to 48% (Canada-pork) of subjects
were not willing to pay a positive amount for traceability alone, whereas for the combined
attributes it ranges from 4% (Canada-beef, Japan, UK) to 13% (U.S.-pork). This result is found
in Figure 1 by summing the bid frequencies for all bids less than or equal to the zero percent bid
for a given country and meat characteristic. To the extent that a higher percentage of a market
willing to buy a product at a price premium is a measure of the potential overall market, the
promotion of traceability alone would capture the smallest market. Among the individual
characteristics, food safety would interest the largest number of individuals at some price
premium as only from 4% (Japan, U.S.-beef) to 15% (Canada-beef, U.S.-pork) of subjects would
not pay a positive amount for additional food safety assurances. These more aggregate results are
similar to estimated treatment effects on individual WTP, which is also evidence that the
treatment effects in Table 2 are not driven by a few aberrant subjects-this would be the case if
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WTP values were highest for meat safety, for example, and yet for additional meat safety the
largest percentage of consumers had WTP equal to zero.

Conclusions
The results from this research have implications for traceable or potentially traceable
products in general, such as diamonds, lumber, or clothing (e.g., clothing identifiably produced
by sweatshop labor). Though traceability may be valued to some extent in and of itself, there is
clearly a role for effectively communicating to consumers the additional product information that
can be verified with traceability. This should not be surprising since information is a value-added
component to a product. Independent third-party verification is clearly a necessary cost of any
traceability system (McCluskey, 2000). This is true because asymmetric information would
likely generate thin or nonexistent markets unless producers can provide a signal to consumers
about the product's invisible attributes (see Akerlof, 1970).
We specifically explore WTP for traceability in food because it is hard to believe that
traceable systems are not in the near future for the immense meat, grain, and other food
industries in the U. S. and Canada. For example, Canada has a target of eventually making 80%
of its domestic food traceable (AAFC, 2002). Our results indicate that traceable systems are not
merely an extra cost of production without any additional product benefits for which consumers
are willing to pay. This suggests that the time for the U.S. is now to devote resources to
providing traceability where WTP is highest and exploit traceable systems to provide and verify
information that consumers and producers value. 17 The alternative is to expend resources on

17Though we only examine consumer WTP, such systems offer efficiency improvement opportunities for
producers as well (e.g. , ability to track efficiency of labor in production). Though difficult to measure, the added
value of such efficiency improvements only increases the opportunity for producers to profitably exploit traceable
systems.
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rent-seeking behavior in an attempt to shelter U.S. food industries from this transition and
witness prominent U.S. industries fall further behind Canadian and other competitor-nation
industries in their implementation of traceable systems as a standard for food industries.
Traceability is a tool that separates the world's largest food systems (Liddell and Bailey,
2001). Dichotomous systems may lead to inefficiencies and confusion. While a requirement in
EU-meat systems, the U. S. meat industry has favored private, rent-seeking activities related to
traceability rather than a regulatory solution. As a result, WTP for traceability has been a critical
issue in American meat marketing chains. Our results suggest that not only American, but
Canadian, British, and Japanese consumers, on the average, are willing to pay non-trivial
positive amounts for red-meat (beef and pork) traceability. However, other characteristics
certifiable with traceability are even more valued than traceability alone (e.g., animal treatment,
meat safety). This implies that traceability as a characteristic is probably best bundled with
additional characteristics.
The results also indicate that demand for traceability-provided characteristics is a general
rather than isolated demographic phenomenon for meat. However, our findings also reflect that a
significant proportion of consumers in all four countries would not pay for traceability or
characteristics that can be verified through a traceable system. This implies that a separate
product line might be warranted for traceable products rather than accepting traceability on a
general basis in a non-regulated system (i.e., since only a portion of consumers are willing to pay
for traceability only a portion of products sold should be traceable). Such systems are likely to be
mandated in many industries nevertheless, and so these findings indicate that opportunities for
producers to remain profitable under a system-wide traceability mandate will still exist.
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Figure 1: Histograms of average percentage bids
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Table 1: Average Group Percentage Bids
(Average bids premia (percentage bids) for exchanging characteristic-verifiable
product for baseline product. Bids are from final 5 rounds averaged across all
individuals and groups)
Meat
Characteristic

Animal
treatment
Meat safety
Traceability
Combined
attributes

USA
pork

Canada
pork

Japan
pork

UK
pork

USA
beef

Canada
beef

20%
23%
18%

13%
13%
7%

27%
29%
25%

17%
18%
19%

16%
20%
7%

19%
18%
9%

43%

21%

49%

34%

35%

37%
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TABLE 2: Random Effects Estimates
Determinants of subject bids (dependent variable=subject's average bid in
final five auction rounds as a percentage of baseline sandwich value)

Variable

Sample=
USA pork
Coef.
(p-value)

Sample=
Can. pork
Coef.
(p-value)

Sample=
Jap. pork
Coef.
(p-value)

Sample=
UK pork
Coef.
(p-value)

Sample=
USA beef
Coef.
(p-value)

Sample=
Can. beef
Coef.
(p-value)

Market
pnce

.130
(.00)***

.081
(.00)***

.001
(.00)***

.224
(.00)***

-.0001
(.79)

.090
(.00)***

Animal
treatment

.050
(.01)***

.039
(00)***

.025
(.02)**

.014
(.09)*

.091
(.00)***

.082
(.02)**

Meat
safety

.044
(.01)***

.024
(.01)***

.046
(.00)***

-.003
(.67)

.132
(.00)***

.076
(.03)**

Combined
attributes

.090
(.00)***

.064
(.00)***

.116
(.00)***

.047
(.00)***

.277
(.00)***

.177
(.00)***

Age

-.006
(.15)

.005
(.02)**

.005
(.05)**

.003
(.38)

.002
(.40)

-.001
(.79)

Income

.0000003
(.88)

-.000001
(.22)

-.00000002 -.0000004
(.01)***
(.83)

-.000001
(.47)

-.00000006
(.76)

Education

.030
(.57)

.022
(.42)

-.007
(.90)

-.043
(.26)

.047
(.39)

Articles

.001
(.81)

-.000
(.92)

-.002
(.13)

.001
(.04)**

-.003
(.06)*

Constant

.124
(.44)

-.120
(.39)

.36
(.84)

-.092
(.57)

.072
(.58)

.105
(.64)

R-squared

.51

.52

.86

.48

.31

.28

-.002
(.94)

*, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level for the two-tailed test, respectively. Group dummy
variables included in each case. Articles could not be included in the UK beef model due to negative estimates of the
variance component for the random effects model. Sensitivity analysis of remaining coefficients with distinct
combinations of demographic variables indicates that the results above are not sensitive to the omission of the
Articles variable for the UK pork sample.

